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 Abstract:  This paper attempted to test whether efficient cooperative rural banks 
(CRBs) have a better control of their agency costs. We used two different concepts of 
efficiency, namely, cost efficiency and alternative profit efficiency, and found 
somewhat different results from both approaches. Using Stochastic Frontier 
Approach and Distribution Free Approach, we tested two different propositions. The 
first proposition is that an adequate corporate governance scheme should improve 
efficiency of CRBs. We failed to find very conclusive evidence that corporate 
governance theories apply to the Philippines’ CRBs. However, the results confirmed 
both  managers’ compensation theory and large stakeholders theory. The second 
proposition is that agency costs should reduce efficiency of CRBs, and we found a 
much clearer relationship on that issue. As expected, most efficient CRBs are 
characterized by a better control of agency costs. These results are in accordance 
with previous studies on shirking behavior among mutual financial intermediaries. We 
also found that rural CRBs are  most profit-efficient, despite their somewhat regular 
cost-efficiency, a manifestation that they are able to charge higher fees for the quality 
of services they offer. Large CRBs are not able to pass their higher costs to 
customers through higher fees. We found that small CRBs might have a better 
interest rate policy, that is, they offer lower rates on both loans and deposits. 
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The population in the Philippines currently stands at 76.5 million. With a population growth rate
of 2.36 percent, which is well above the world population growth rate of 1.3 percent, 1.7 million will
be added each year to the country’s population. Since the economy in the last 15 years has grown
only modestly, the number of poor people inevitably keeps on rising. Thus, despite the fact that
the number of families falling below the poverty line had declined from 44.2 percent in 1985 to 34.2
percent in 2000, the absolute number of poor people had risen from 26.2 million to 31.3 million during
the same period. A great majority of the income earners of poor households are self-employed.
The 1998 Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS) shows that 70 percent of the poorest 40
percent of the respondents relied on entrepreneurial activities as main source of income. However,
only 25 percent out of the 8.5 million households with businesses surveyed had obtained credit to
ﬁnance their business. These households, while self-employed and without access to credit, often
experience ﬂuctuations in income and sometimes need extra funds to cope with emergencies, such as
sickness and natural calamities. When any of these happens, these households are often forced to use
the working capital for their small business and/or sell whatever ﬁxed assets they have. Selling a cow
or carabao and farm/business equipment is not an uncommon occurrence among poor households.
These poor households, therefore, need the services that would address the ﬁnancing requirements
of their livelihood and consumption needs including lumpy nonfood expenses for health, education
and housing improvements.
Development practitioners and policymakers view microﬁnance as one of the solutions to the
growing demand for ﬁnancial services by poor households and to the reality that most formal ﬁnancial
institutions do not serve the poor because of perceived high risks, high costs involved in small
transactions, perceived low proﬁtability and inability of the poor to provide the required physical
collateral (ADB 2000). Most if not all of these ﬁnancial institutions have a business culture that is
not geared towards servicing the poor and low-income households. Through microﬁnance, ﬁnancial
services like savings, credit, and insurance facilities, can be delivered to poor households who will,
in eﬀect, be able to smoothen their consumption, manage their risks, build their assets gradually,
develop their microenterprises, enhance their income earning capacity and enjoy an improved quality
of life. Without permanent access to institutional microﬁnance, most poor households continue
to rely on meager funds from savings and informal sources, which further limit their income and
production capacities.
Sustainability of microﬁnance institutions is a crucial consideration for the poorest of the poor,
and a thorough review of the characteristics of healthy microﬁnance institutions should be given a
high priority by all regulatory agencies supervising these institutions. This study, therefore, attempts
to analyze the characteristics of the most eﬃcient cooperative rural banks (CRBs) of Philppines
with the aim of providing better information to regulatory agencies in regulating and supervising
microﬁnance institutions (MFIs).
1.1 Philippines’ microﬁnance system
The Philippine ﬁnancial system consists of formal and informal ﬁnancial intermediaries. The informal
sector is composed of heterogeneous players, such as moneylenders and ROSCAS. The formal ﬁnancial
system can further be broken down into banking institutions, which are authorized to provide credit
and accept deposits from the general public, and non-bank institutions, which are authorized to
1extend loans but are not permitted to accept deposits from the general public.
The banking system is composed of the commercial banking system (universal and ordinary com-
mercial banks), the thrift banking system (savings and mortgage banks, private development banks
and stock saving and loans associations), the rural banking system (ordinary or stock rural banks
and cooperative rural banks), and government-owned banks. In terms of assets, the banking system
overwhelmingly dominates the ﬁnancial system. Its total assets as of December 2000 amounted to
P3.3 trillion, or 82 percent of the total assets of the ﬁnancial system. In the Philippines, MFIs are
categorized into the following: rural banks including CRBs; credit-granting non-government organi-
zations (NGOs); and credit unions/cooperatives. While MFIs have steadily increased the volume of
loans granted to their clients through the years, their combined market share has remained below
5% (Agabin 1998) [1].
1.2 Philippines’ rural banks
Both stock and cooperative rural banks are active in the Philippines’ microﬁnance sector. Rural
banks are private banks that were established in the 1950s with government assistance and subsidies
to provide services to the agricultural sector. There were about 800 rural banks in 2000 scattered
all over the country. Up until the 1980s, they constituted a system of unit banks that is unique in
the developing world, and many of them grew out of the operations of moneylenders. The number
of CRBs rose from 15 in 1975 to 50 in 2000.
A CRB has a dual personality, that of being a cooperative, on one hand, and a bank, on the
other. A CRB is, thus, governed by both banking and cooperative laws, particularly, the New Rural
Bank Act or RA 7353, the General Banking Law of 2000 or RA 8791, the Cooperative Code or RA
6938 and the Cooperative Development Authority Act or RA 6939. CRBs are organized primarily
to provide ﬁnancial and credit services to cooperatives and may perform any or all of the services
oﬀered by stock rural banks. Only duly established cooperatives and federations of cooperatives
which are registered or re-registered with the Cooperative Development Authority under Republic
Act 6938 may become members/organizers of CRBs. A CRB services an average of 5,000 individual
borrowers (Guanlao 1999) [19].
Besides increasing geographical diversiﬁcation, stock and cooperative rural banks have, over time,
been increasingly diversifying their loan portfolio across major economic activities. In contrast to
the 1980s, today CRBs’ loans are less concentrated in the agricultural sector. There has also been a
substantial change in the way rural banks ﬁnance their lending operations over the years. In 1980,
deposits comprised only 43 percent of their total liabilities. A big chunk of their liabilities comprised
borrowings from the Central Bank and other special credit programs of the government. The radical
change in rediscounting and interest rate policies in the mid-1980s has encouraged rural banks to
mobilize deposits and to rely less on the rediscounting window of the Central Bank for funds. Thus,
by 1998, the share of deposits in the total liabilities of rural banks rose to 74 percent. An increase
of deposits ﬁnancing is a normal trend for growing microﬁnance institutions. In eﬀect as conﬁdence
of consumers towards the institution grows, governmental and grant ﬁnancing can be reduced, in
favour of greater amounts of customers deposits. This trend is very positive, though it also brings
an additional consideration: It atomizes the sources of ﬁnancing from a few major donors to various
small depositors. Greater diﬀusion in sources of funds enables managers to actualte more freely
and thus gives room for expense preference. This creates a common phenomenon in microﬁnance
institutions: The cycle ”growth-diﬀusion of ﬁnancing-failure”. In order to avoid this cycle, regulators
2should always keep in mind the phenomenon and thus maintain a strong control over expenses of
large CRBs.
1.3 Regulatory issues
One of the lessons of the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis is that banks must be well-regulated and ade-
quately supervised. However, new prudential regulations, if applied uniformly to all types of ﬁnancial
institutions, could further force ﬁnancial intermediaries to ration out small borrowers. Thus, the
newly passed General Banking Law tries to achieve a balance between the objectives of tightening
up prudential regulations and ensuring the ﬂow of ﬁnancial services to microenterprises and poor
households. This Law includes three provisions concerning microﬁnance to encourage banks to lend
to microﬁnance borrowers not on the basis of a collateral they can present, which many of them do
not have any, but rather on the basis of their cash ﬂows.
The existence of adequate banking oﬃces in all areas in the country can improve access of poor
households to banking services. Beginning in 1989, the Central Bank relaxed the regulation on bank
entry and branching. This led to the proliferation of banks and branches in the country. Many of
these banks became in distress in the aftermath of the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis and the ”El Niño”
weather phenomenon that struck in 1998. Thus, the Central Bank has declared a moratorium on
the opening of new banks and has encouraged merger/consolidation to strengthen their ﬁnancial
position. However, to ensure that microﬁnance services will not diminishe s p e c i a l l yi nr u r a la r e a s ,
the Central Bank recently approved a partial lifting of the general moratorium on the licensing
of new thrift and rural banks to allow entry of microﬁnance-oriented banks. A rural bank to be
established as a microﬁnance bank is required to have a minimum paid-in capital of PhP5 million
(about US$100,000) while the existing capitalization requirement for thrift banks apply.
The regulatory framework of rural banks in Philippines is substantially diﬀerent from existing
systems found in African and Latin American countries. More speciﬁcally, a prospective cooperative
bank shall ﬁle its application for licensing as a bank with the Central Bank and upon approval,
shall be registered with the Cooperative Development Authority. However, only the Central Bank is
responsible for regulating and supervising all CRBs. Since CRBs operate under the New Rural Bank
Act, the Central Bank treats them like ordinary or stock rural banks. Only one (1) cooperative bank
shall be established per province. Market is thus segmented by Law to avoid excessive competition
and ineﬃcient use of branch oﬃces among CRBs. However, CRBs compete with thrift banks, rural
banks and branches of rural banks operating in their respective provinces.
1.4 Conceptual framework
Experience shows that the CRBs, whose ownership is generally more diﬀuse than rural banks, had a
weaker performance through time than the latter. Reliance on government funds might be associated
with this weaker performance. Also interestingly, cooperatives that did not focus on agricultural,
electric and transport activities between 1973 and 1986, while the government was pursuing a devel-
opment policy for these sectors, had a self-reliant and progressive development that contributed to
their business viability and success. We propose to study the characteristics of most eﬃcient CRBs,
to see whether their corporate governance increased their sustainability through better control of
agency costs. We formulate two propositions:
Proposition 1 Eﬃcient CRBs have a better corporate governance scheme.
3Proposition 2 Eﬃcient CRBs have a better control of agency costs.
Each proposition will be decomposed further into several aspects, which will be tested in section
6. We will ﬁrst discuss in detail the concept of eﬃciency. Eﬃcient ﬁnancial intermediaries produce a
quantity of output at a lower cost than any other intermediary producing the same level of output.
Eﬃciency measurement refers to a comparison of costs of a particular CRB and the most eﬃcient
CRB producing the same level of output. For each level of output, we can ﬁnd a most eﬃcient CRB,
and the combination of all these most eﬃcient CRBs produces the eﬃcient cost frontier. Then we
estimate the deviation of speciﬁcC R B sf r o mt h e i rm o s te ﬃcient counterparts, and try to explain
these diﬀerences.
We propose to test the relationship of eﬃciency with various correlates of corporate governance
and agency costs, among others. A similar approach is made for proﬁte ﬃciency. The review of
literature, presented in the next section, is divided into two sections. The ﬁrst deals with eﬃciency
of ﬁnancial intermediaries, and the second, ownership and corporate governance. Since an extensive
review of literature on agency costs theory and empirical studies is presented in other articles of this
special number, this paper will not cover this literature.
2 Review of litterature
2.1 Eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediaries
Existing studies estimated the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediaries using either parametric or non-
parametric techniques. The former assumes a random component in the measurement of eﬃciency,
while the latter assumes that the random component is absent and diﬀerences in total costs (or
proﬁts) are completely explained by diﬀerences in eﬃciency. According to Berger and Humphrey
(1997) [6], most U.S. studies used parametric techniques (110 studies), rather than non-parametric
techniques (78 studies). We would like to note that parametric and non-parametric techniques are
further divided into various methodologies. We will not judge the relative strengths of these methods
here. We rather refer the readers to Berger and Mester (1997) [7] for a thorough review of litterature.
These authors advocate for the use of parametric methods rather than non-parametric methods to
take into account not only technical eﬃciency but also price-eﬀects (allocative eﬃciency).
McNulty and Verbrugge (1988) studied stock and mutual S&L, and found no clear diﬀerence
of cost eﬃciency among both types. So, we can expect that the methodologies applied to proﬁt
maximizing institutions would also be valid for non-proﬁt institutions.
Several studies on eﬃciency measurement consider the relationship of eﬃciency with various
correlates. Among the most frequently used correlates of ineﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediaries, we
ﬁnd a negative relationship with size (Hardwick (1990) [21], Drake and Weyman-Jones (1992)[11],
Cebenoyan at al. (1993)[8], Mester (1993)[36],and Eisenbis, Ferrier, and Kwan (1999) [12]), a negative
relationship with capital ([36], [12] ), and a positive relationship with portfolio risk (Eisenbis, Ferrier,
and Kwan (1999) [12]). Considering ﬁnancial cooperatives more speciﬁcally, Worthington (1998)
[41]also found a negative relationship with size, a negative relationship with capital, and a negative
relationship with the number of branches.
42.2 Ownership and corporate governance
Corporate governance can be deﬁned as the combination of all measures that insure managers to act
in the best interest of investors, e.g. to insure they r e c e i v ea na d e q u a t er e t u r no nt h e i ri n v e s t m e n t .
It was demonstrated that an adequate corporate governance scheme can reduce agency costs within
corporations (See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) [38]). These authors presented two ways of increasing
eﬃciency of corporate governance. One is to adopt appropriate legal protection of both small and
large investors, and the other, to increase concentration of ownership.
It has been demonstrated that concentration of ownership induces managers to be more eﬃcient
(see Holderness and Sheehan (1988)[23] ). This is because major stakeholders have stronger nego-
tiating power when they face managers, as well as better incentives to keep track of decisions of
the latter. This view is generally known as the Large Shareholders Theory and constitutes the ﬁrst
part of the tests we will perform later. Some results were found for a cooperative form of ownership
though (See Hansmann (1988) [20], Hart and Moore (1994) [22], and Schleifer and Vishny (1997)
[38]). These authors suggested that when large nonshareholder constituencies such as managers,
employees or any other stakeholders are left with little rent to capture, a greater concentration of
ownership might not be optimal for value maximization of the ﬁrm.
Jensen’s Free Cash Flow Theory stipulates that an appropriate policy to control agency costs
i st ol i m i tf r e ec a s hﬂows available to constrain the expense preference behavior of managers. This
can be done by having an adequate level of debt, and a strong control from the institution’s owners.
Increased concentration of ownership and greater ﬁnancial leverage limit managers’ incentives to
spend on perks and other wasteful activities. Existing litterature on this subject concentrated on
performance of LBO versus non-LBO ﬁrms. Leveraged ﬁr m sa p p e a r e dt ob em o r ee ﬃcient than
their non-LBO counterparts (see Jensen (1989) [30], Kaplan (1989) [32], Smith (1990) [39] and other
authors in the same number). The recent tendency of CRBs to mobilize more deposits to ﬁnance their
lending operations seems to ﬁt well with the propositions of recent theory on corporate governance.
We thus propose to test whether most eﬃcient CRBs actually had a greater proportion of deposit
ﬁnancing.
Another important aspect of corporate management is included under the Managers’ Compen-
sation Theory, which suggests that a higher compensation for managers may give them suﬃcient
incentives to improve eﬃciency. A number of studies have argued that performance-based com-
pensation is preferable to ﬁxed compensation in order to give adequate incentives to managers to
maximize the value of the ﬁrm (see Holmstrom (1979) [24], Grossman and Hart (1983) [18], Lambert
and Larcker (1987) [34], Jensen and Murphy (1990) [31], and Mehran (1995) ). Houston and James
(1995) [25] demonstrated that existing compensation scheme of bank’s managers is not suﬃciently
performance-based to encourage them to take suﬃcient risks to maximize the value of the ﬁrm.
3M e t h o d o l o g y
The main objective of estimating a production function is to explain the quantity of output produced
given certain levels of inputs and other relevant factors that might explain the quantity of output
produced. Both the production and the intermediation approaches have been used to model the
production of ﬁnancial institutions. The former considers the institution as a producer of two goods,
namely, loans and deposits. The outputs are estimated in number of accounts, while operational
costs are represented on the left hand side. The latter, on the other hand, considers the amount of
5loans and investments as the outputs, while the values of deposits, capital and wages are considered
as the inputs. Interests are added to operating costs on the left hand side to reﬂect the addition of
deposits as an input.
We use the intermediation approach and introduce the possibility of non-linear demand for in-
puts (the αij terms), as well as a random component, which can be decomposed into an eﬃciency
component Ln(uc) and a random component Ln(εc). The random component simply means that
the total costs can be explained not only by input prices but also by an ineﬃciency factor speciﬁct o
each institution, and a random component including all other factors that might aﬀect total costs.
To decompose these eﬀects, we use two well recognized methodologies, namely, the stochastic fron-
tier approach (SFA) and the distribution-free approach (DFA). Each of these approaches has its
own strengths and weaknesses, which we will elaborate below. The main reason for using these two
approaches is strengthen the conclusions that we can derive from the results of our analysis. We do
not introduce the usual restrictions of cost minimization (proﬁt maximization) as we are assuming
that CRBs do not minimize costs (maximize proﬁts).
A critical assumption associated in the SFA models is that the error term can be decomposed
into a random component (Ln(εc)), following a normal distribution, and an eﬃciency component
(Ln(uc)), following a half-normal distribution. Many alternative models have been proposed to avoid
this critical assumption as the hypothesis of half-normal distribution of the eﬃciency component
received some criticisms recently (Greene (1990)[17] and Berger (1993)[4]). We concentrate on three
alternatives. The ﬁrst consists of eliminating the random component of the error term with the use
of a non-parametric model, such as the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) or the Free Disposal
Hull (FDH). As mentionned earlier, DEA avoids the decomposition of errors between eﬃciency and
randomness by assuming that the random component is simply not present and that the diﬀerences
in the total costs are completely explained by diﬀerences in eﬃciency (Aly et al.(1990) [3]; Ferrier and
Lovell (1990)[15]; Eliasiani and Mehdian (1990)[13]; Ferrier et al. (1991)[14]; Fixler and Zieschang
(1991)[16]; Aly et al.(1990) [3]).
The second alternative model, such as the TFA (Lozano (1997)[35]), sets the limit between
random error and eﬃciency. This methodology assumes that the deviations from predicted costs
within the lowest quartile are attributable to random error, while deviations in the remaining quartiles
are attributable to eﬃciency. As was discussed in Berger (1993) [4], TFA only substitutes the
assumption about the distribution of the error term for an equally arbitrary assumption about
where eﬃciency stops and the random error begins.
The results signiﬁcantly diﬀer from one methodology to another. This has prompted some critics
to further elaborate both approaches. Berger and Humphrey attribute the inconsistent rankings
to the major ”sins” of these two approaches - viz., too little account of random error by the non-
parametric studies and too much structure imposed on the frontier by the parametric approaches.[5]
The third alternative model is to consider a random error component, but eliminate all the
distributional constraints by using a panel data set. The virtues of Distribution Free Approach
(DFA) estimates, obtained with a panel data set, were described originally in Schmidt and Sickles
(1984)[37] and later in Berger (1993) [4], and Berger and Mester (1997) [7]. Robert DeYoung ([10])
also developed a methodology to evaluate the most adequate number of years to consider, with data
covering 618 U.S. commercial banks over eleven (11) years. He found that a six-year period is the
best compromise between too little (which introduces a large dispersion of residuals) and too much
time periods (which is delicate if some trends are included in the data). In our case, the method
6consists of estimating the average ineﬃciency of each CRB over the ﬁve year period extending
from December 1995 to December 1999. This constitutes the non-random component (Ln(uc))
attributable to eﬃciency. This measure is compared to most eﬃcient CRB over the same period,
avoiding short term variations. The assumption here is that each CRB has a speciﬁci n e ﬃciency
that is observed over this ﬁve year period, but is also subject to some random error due to external
factors such as macroeconomic problems, or unusual weather conditions, such as ”El Niño” weather
phenomenon.
We do not impose the homotheticity assumption by adding the quantities of outputs on the right
hand side (RHS), as well as all the cross-product between prices of inputs and quantities of outputs. In
eﬀect, when introducing outputs as independant variables, we relax the simple relationship between
inputs and costs. The addition of outputs on the RHS is common wihin the intermediation approach
and frequently used to study economies of scale in ﬁnancial institutions.
3.1 Model 1: Cost eﬃciency




























The model is estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) for the DFA and maximum
likelihood estimation procedure for the SFA developed by Coelli (1994)1.
We now present in more detail the variables we used to estimate the cost function. Table I shows
the deﬁnitions and characteristics of each variable included in our ﬁrst model (Equation 1). The
dependent variable is represented by costs of each CRB, in million pesos, deﬂated by the national
Consumer Price Index using 1995 as the base year. The outputs we consider are loans and securities,
while the prices we include are real wages, real cost of materials, interest rate on deposits, interest
rate on ﬁnancial obligations and cost of other inputs.2 After estimating the cost eﬃciency for each
CRB, we proceed to compare with the most eﬃc i e n tC R B .F o rt h eD F A ,w ee s t i m a t et h ef o l l o w i n g









Where CMin is the minimal cost, associated with the most eﬃcient CRB, and C is the cost of
as p e c i ﬁc CRB. Equation 2 gives the proportion of costs that is eﬃciently used by the CRB. For
1The model was estimated using Coelli’s (1994) program[9].
2Hugues, Mester, and Moon (2000)[29], with a data set consisting of 441 bank holding companies demonstrated
that inclusion of capital structure (see also [28], [36],[26], [27] and [7]) and risk-taking into eﬃciency measurement
improves the estimated coeﬃcients, two variables also included in Hugues and Mester (1998). We included the ratio of
liabilities over capital as an independent variable to take into consideration the impact of leverage on costs, as a small
CRB does not have access to the same amount of deposits due to a lesser capital. Bigger CRBs have more possibilities
to generate proﬁt because they already accumulated some reserves over time that give them more ﬂexibility in their
assets-management. We also included ex post credit risk as another independent variable, to consider the fact greater
risk-taking might increase proﬁts, but also endangers the sustainability of the institution. Notwithstanding, none of
these two variables has signiﬁcant signs, so we do not include them into our ﬁnal regressions.
7example, if CMin is representing 70% of C, 70% of costs of this CRB is used eﬃciently, and 30% is
wasted ineﬃciently. The SFA, on the other hand, produces estimates of the ineﬃciency (rather than
eﬃciency) of each CRB. For example, a ﬁgure of 10% means that the CRB concerned incurs 10%
more than the cost of the most eﬃcient CRB for the same quantity of outputs produced. They are
equivalent, however, in the sense that the most cost-ineﬃcient CRB in the SFA is taken to mean the
least cost eﬃcient in the DFA.
We deﬁne four size groups based on the real value of assets. The ﬁrst group includes CRBs whose
assets are below 20 million pesos, the second group between 20 and 30 million pesos, the third group
between 30 and 60 million pesos, and the fourth group above 60 million pesos.
3.2 Model 2: Proﬁte ﬃciency
As discussed earlier, CRBs could have provided better services to their members. However, doing
so only increases the costs of the CRB. In eﬀect, we would be penalizing institutions for adopting
a strategy of providing better services to their clients, despite the fact that some clients might be
willing to pay the additional costs to beneﬁt from improved services. To avoid penalizing CRBs that
are providing better services to their clients, we also estimate an alternative proﬁt function besides
the cost function. This function enables CRBs to have greater costs but still be competitive through
improved services, as reﬂected in higher proﬁts. This proposition is inspired by Berger and Mester





























The model is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression for the DFA and maximul
likelihood estimation procedure for the SFA. In order to compare eﬃciency of CRBs, we need to
establish a common measure of what we will call a ”target model”, an exercise similar to the one we
have done with the ”Cost eﬃciency function”. This target is deﬁned as the maximum proﬁtt h a t








Equation 4 gives the proportion of the actual proﬁt of a speciﬁc CRB to its maximum potential
proﬁt. Both the SFA and DFA use the same procedure for estimating proﬁte ﬃciency and hence the
results should be interpreted in the same manner.
4D a t a
We used annual data of 50 CRBs operating in both rural and urban regions of the Philippines for
the period 1995-1999.3 The variables used to estimate eﬃciency are deﬁned in Table I together with
3We eliminated observations with incomplete data, leaving 216 observations for the stochastic frontier approach, and
209 for the distribution-free approach (we eliminated observations of less than three years of data). The information
8their descriptive statistics. The correlates of eﬃciency are also presented in the same table. The
dependent variables diﬀer for each model; that is, real cost of inputs for Model I and real proﬁtf o r
Model II. The independent variables we used are the cost of inputs and the quantity of outputs all
in real terms.
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Eﬃciency regressions
The results of estimating Equation 1 and Equation 3 are presented in Table II. We present the results
of both the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and the distribution-free approach (DFA). The signs
of the coeﬃcients of the cost function are generally the same for both the SFA and DFA. In the
case of the proﬁt function, however, quite a number of coeﬃcients have diﬀerent signs for the two
approaches.
The eﬃciency measures by size of CRBs are shown in Table III. These are simple averages of
individual-eﬃciencies within each size group. Before proceeding with the discussion of the results,
care should be exercised in interpreting the results in Panel A. As already mentioned earlier, the
SFA produces cost-ineﬃciency measures whereas the DFA generates cost-eﬃciency measures.
As shown in Panel A, the average cost-eﬃciency varies very little among the asset size groups
regardless of the approach being used. Interestingly, they show similar pattern. For SFA, the average
cost-ineﬃciency increases as asset size increases, then declines as asset size increases further (inverted
U-curve). For DFA, it declines ﬁrst, then increases as asset size increases (U-curve). Both results
are consitent with each other. However, there are diﬀerences in the results produced by the two
approaches. First, the SFA shows that CRBs are on average 10.25% cost-ineﬃcient while the DFA,
85.25% cost-eﬃcient. Second, the SFA results suggest that CRBs with asset size of less than 20
million pesos are the least cost-ineﬃcient CRBs, whereas the DFA shows that CRBs with assets of
more than 60 million pesos are the most cost-eﬃcient. Third, the most cost-ineﬃcient CRBs in the
SFA are those with assets of 30-60 million pesos, whereas the least cost-eﬃcient CRBs in the DFA
are those having assets of 20-30 million pesos. Thus, the results derived from the two approaches
would not allow us to make a conclusion regarding which asset-size group is the most cost-eﬃcient.
Panel B shows the average proﬁte ﬃciency by the same asset-size groups. The SFA produces
higher average proﬁte ﬃency than the DFA. This is consistent with the results obtained for cost eﬃ-
ciency measures discussed above. Here, the results obtained from the two approaches are completely
diﬀerent from each other. SFA exhibits an inverted U-curve, that is, the average proﬁte ﬃciency
increases ﬁrst, then declines as asset size increases, whereas the DFA shows a U-curve, that is, the
average proﬁte ﬃciency declines ﬁrst, then increases as asset size increases. Also, the least proﬁt-
eﬃcient asset-size group in the SFA is the most proﬁt-eﬃcient in the DFA. Thus, we cannot reach a
clear conclusion regarding which asset-size group is the most proﬁte ﬃcient.
Interestingly, according to the SFA, small and large CRBs have better cost-eﬃciency, and yet
they have the worst proﬁt-eﬃciency. These institutions, as argued by Berger and Mester, could be
characterized by a greater market power. In the case of very large CRBs we can understand that
their size can allow them to exercise some market power in the highly concentrated CRB market.
is conform with the requirements established within COFI (stands for Community Oriented Financial Intermediaries)
project. The complete list of variables is available upon request.
9But the same cannot be said of very small CRBs. We have to admit that some factors other than size
could have aﬀected the results. We suspect that quality of relationship with members might have
s o m e t h i n gt od ow i t ht h i sg r e a t e rmarket power. This should be investigated further, but we would
like to present some possibilities that maybe interesting to consider in the future. We estimated the
median quality and diversity of products, and found that small CRBs are not oﬀering better quality
of service or diversity of products, as can be observed below:
Size Median quality of service4 Mean diversity of products5
Below 40M 4,55% 2,90
40-60M 13,06% 3,81
60-80M 11,67% 3,65
Above 80M 14,22% 3,78
We then considered two alternative indicators of quality of service to clients, namely, lower
interest rates on loans and high interest rates on deposits. We calculated a comparative measure
inspired from Smith [40] to estimate the relative advantage of creditors (clients who hold a credit
from the CRB) and debtors (clients who hold a deposit in the CRB). The advantage to creditors is
the diﬀerence between the median rate on loans6 of our complete sample of CRBs and the rate asked
by each CRB to their clients. The interpretation is that the lower the rate charged by a particular
CRB (compared to sector’s median) to its customers, the greater the advantage oﬀered to creditors.
The deﬁnition of advantage to debtors is a little diﬀerent: It’s the diﬀerence between the rate oﬀered
on deposits of each CRB and the median rate oﬀered by the sector. The greater the diﬀerence,
the greater the advantage to depositors of the CRB. We ﬁnd that CRBs whose assets are below 60
million pesos oﬀer lower lending rates as well as lower deposit rates - a scheme that might be more
appropriate for their clients. Larger CRBs, on the other hand, oﬀer higher deposit rates and also
charge higher lending rates.
Size Advantage to creditors Advantage to debtors
Below 40M 0,45% -0,32%
40-60M 0,37% -0,36%
60-80M -2,89% 0,37%
Above 80M -0,90% 0,93%
We observe that relative advantages of creditors and debtors are strongly related to the relative
importance of respective stakeholders. Small CRBs are characterized by large creditors7 and small
debtors8. The interests of creditors should be dominant in small CRBs, as larger stakeholders have
a greater negotiating power.
4Deﬁned as non-ﬁnancial operating income, in millions, deﬂated by national 1995 Consumer Price Index / Number
of members. We consider this ratio as a measure of quality of service to clients. The measure was considered by
Worthington [41] and Kumbhakar et al. (2001)[33] as an approximation of diversity of services.
5Deﬁned as a Diversity of services Index (Add 1 for each service the credit union oﬀers among the following:
Commercial, Consumer, or Mortgage loans, and Deposits), [1, 2, 3, 4, or 5]. The index is a combination of four dummy
variables, taking a value of one when the product is oﬀered, and zero when it is not.
6Calculated as the ratio of interest income over total loans.
7Average credit of 131 324 pesos for small CRBs, compared to a 20 000-27 000 pesos for the remaining size groups.
831 679 pesos on average. Remaining size groups have smaller ﬁgures.
10To conclude this section, we would like to review the most important results. Small and large CRB
are less cost eﬃcient, but more proﬁte ﬃcient. Cost ineﬃciency of small CRBs can be explained
by diseconomies of scale, while large CRBs probably manifest some expense preference. In the
case of large CRBs, greater proﬁte ﬃcience can be explained by a greater market power, but for
small CRBs, further investigation should be done in order to explain proﬁte ﬃciency. We could not
demonstrate that small CRBs are providing more services to their members. However, results show
a clear tendency of small CRBs to give greater advantage to their borrowers through lower interest
rates on loans. This behavior was not observed for larger CRBs, which charged higher rates on loans
to give higher rates on their deposits.
5.2 Correlates of eﬃciency
Before studying the relationship of our four eﬃciency measures with various risk variables, we would
like to know whether these measures are positively correlated with the rate of return on assets (ROA),
a widely accepted indicator of sustainability of ﬁnancial institutions. The results of regressing ROA
on our four eﬃciency measures are shown below. The positive relationship between ROA and the SFA
proﬁte ﬃciency measure is statistically signiﬁcant, which is to be expected. A proﬁte ﬃcient CRB
should be ﬁnancially sustainable. The other results in the table below do not show any statistical
signiﬁcance.
Alternative eﬃciency measures Coeﬃcient Signiﬁcance
Cost eﬃciency, Stochastic Frontier Approach 0,004
Cost eﬃciency, Distribution-Free Approach -0,059
Proﬁte ﬃciency, Stochastic Frontier Approach 0,583 ***9
Proﬁte ﬃciency, Distribution-Free Approach -0,120
We have considered four major groups of correlates of eﬃciency: market and macro-economic
characteristics; corporate governance; risk; and agency costs. The variables and their descriptive
statistics are presented in Table I. We would like to point out that three quarters of CRBs are
located in predominantly rural provinces of the country. Average credit risk is 22,34% for CRBs
compared with only 7,33% for the commercial banking sector. This could be the reason why 9%
of the CRBs had to be assisted by the government in the last ﬁve years in the form of temporary
capital infusion which the CRBs have to liquidate over a period of time.
Now let us discuss the results of a multivariate regression including the complete list of correlates.
These results are presented in Table IV. Before proceeding, it should be recalled that the SFA
produces cost-ineﬃciency measures while DFA, eﬃciency measures. The signs of the correlates’
coeﬃcients of the two approaches should therefore be opposite to each other to obtain consistent
results. With respect to proﬁte ﬃciency, the signs of the correlates coeﬃcients should be the same
for both the SFA and DFA. The discussions below focus only on those correlates that are found to
have statistically signiﬁcant relationship with the the eﬃciency measures.
9Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
115.2.1 Measures of market characteristics
Regardless of the approach being used, geographical location (i.e., rural or urban regions) does not
show any eﬀect on the cost or proﬁte ﬃciency of CRBs. Real GDP growth increases cost and proﬁt
eﬃciency. However, growth of regional domestic product has a positive impact on CRBs’ proﬁt
eﬃciency. Banking density produces diﬀerent results for both approaches. In the case of FSA, it
aﬀects cost-ineﬃciency positively, meaning that provinces with fewer banks serving the population
tend to have more cost-ineﬃcient CRBs. On the other hand, the DFA results suggest that banking
density has a positive impact on cost and proﬁte ﬃciency of banks. These contradictory results need
to be investigated further. As regards the time trend, it has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on proﬁt
eﬃciency under the SFA. It is to be noted that because of the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis and the
El Nino weather phenomenon, the Philippine banking system including CRBs has been experiencing
ﬁnancial diﬃculties as can be observed from the rising non-performing loans since 1998.
5.2.2 Measures of corporate governance
We tested three theories of corporate governance: manager’s compensation theory; free cash ﬂows
theory; and large shareholders theory. We obtained mixed results. We found that a higher compen-
sation of managers, as indicated by MGTWAGE, tends to increase proﬁt-eﬃciency of CRBs, which
supports the existing theory on manager’s compensation. The variable, AVGSHR, which measures
the average value of shareholdings, increases cost- and proﬁt-eﬃciency of CRBs.10 These results
are consistent with the large shareholders theory and support the observations of Hansmann, Hart
and Moore, and Schleifer and Vishny discussed earlier. However, we obtained some results that
are not completely in accordance with existing theories on corporate governance. For instance, the
variable, SHRDUM, raises cost-ineﬃciency. This conﬁrms the free cash ﬂow theory because a higher
proportion of capital to total liabilities means that more cash ﬂows are available for perks, which
eﬀectively reduces cost eﬃciency. On the other hand, it raises proﬁte ﬃciency, which is contrary
t ot h ef r e ec a s hﬂow theory. Another variable, DEPLIAB, does not exhibit any signiﬁcant eﬀect
on any of the eﬃciency measures. It therefore does not give any indication as to whether or not it
s u p p o r t st h ef r e ec a s hﬂow theory, which states that greater interest burden on deposits and ﬁnancial
obligations (increase of ﬁnancial costs) translates into less ﬂexibility for perks, and thus improves
proﬁte ﬃciency. We also considered the extent of support provided by the government to CRBs
and found that it signiﬁcantly reduces cost-ineﬃciency of CRBs. This is to be expected since CRBs
that received ﬁnancial assistance by the government are closely monitored by regulatory agencies.
Contrary to some common belief the intervention of the State in the activities of some CRBs proved
to be fruitful.
5.2.3 Measures of risk
Credit risk, leverage and interest rate risk all are expected to increase cost- and proﬁt-eﬃciency
of CRBs. The results are mix. Credit risk (CRRISK) raises cost-ineﬃciency in the case of the
S F A ,w h i l ei ti n c r e a s e sc o s t - e ﬃciency in the case of the DFA. However, both approaches generated
results suggesting that credit risk raises proﬁte ﬃciency, conﬁrming results found in previous studies.
10We test whether the coeﬃcient associated to AVGSHR is signiﬁcantly positive. In all but one case we do ﬁnd
conclusive results.
12Interest rate gap (INTGAP) is found to have statistically signiﬁcant, positive eﬀect on proﬁte ﬃciency
under the DFA, which supports a priori expectations. The variable, LEVERAGE, does not have any
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the eﬃciency measures regardless of the approach being used.
5.2.4 Measures of agency costs
The most conclusive results are obtained in the case of agency costs. The coeﬃcients of the three
variables representing diﬀerent dimensions of agency costs have the expected signs and are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. The quantity of assets per member, ASSETMEMB, a measure of empire building,
is positively correlated with cost eﬃciency estimated by the DFA as well as the proﬁt-eﬃciency esti-
mated by both approaches. The interpretation of a positive coeﬃcient might be that greater assets
permit better diversiﬁcation. The ratio of deposits over credit, DEPCRED, a measure of funds ac-
quired from members that are not used for ﬁnancial intermediation, but rather wasted in ineﬃcient
operations such as maintaining luxury oﬃces, cars for managers, etc. is negatively correlated with
cost-eﬃciency. A similar result is obtained for FIXASSETS, which is the proportion of ﬁxed assets
to total assets. However, contrary to a priori expectations, the suﬃciency of ﬁnancial margin to
cover operational expenses, SUFMARG, is positively correlated with cost-ineﬃciency.
We would like to take a few lines to concentrate on the manager’s compensation theory as it
relates to the the latest literature on corporate governance and agency costs. We want to focus
on that issue in order to deal with those who might propose putting controls on compensation of
CRBs’ top managers so as not to endanger the sustainability of CRBs. Thus, we have analyzed the
relationship of top manager’s relative salary with various measures of risk. The results are presented
in Table V. To construct this table, we ﬁrst ordered the observations on the basis of the ratio of top
manager’s salary to personnel expenses within each size group. At the outset, we want to highlight
a rather surprising result, that is, small CRBs (those with assets of less than 30 million pesos) are
paying their managers better than all their larger counterparts. This result may be attributed to
their relative eﬃciency as well as to the fact that they have a lean staﬀ. We have observed that an
increase of top manager’s relative compensation reduces agency costs and improves performance of
the CRB. The estimates shown in groups 3 and 4 indicate that the ratio of ﬁnancial margin over
operational costs is higher for CRBs oﬀering a better pay to their top managers. The ratios of ﬁxed
assets to total assets and deposits to total loans are lower for CRBs oﬀering a better compensation,
except for the smallest institutions. We also related top managers’ compensation with three variables
of corporate governance and four variables of eﬃciency, but did not ﬁnd any conclusive results. As
can be observed, the results are not very clear, and more research should be devoted to that issue. A
positive relationship seems to exist between top managers’ compensation and ROA. Altman (1983)
[2], considered various studies on bankruptcy prediction and found that a high ROA could reduce the
probability of failure of the ﬁnancial institution. We conclude that a better compensation package for
top managers can improve the sustainability of the CRBs, and sustainable microﬁnance institutions
will have a long-term beneﬁcial impact on poverty reduction in Philippines.
6 Conclusion and recommendations
The eﬀort to alleviate poverty in emerging economies can be enhanced with the creation of eﬃcient
and sustainable microﬁnance institutions. In order to increase sustainability of such institutions,
13we ﬁrst have to know the characteristics of the most successful microﬁnance institutions. Cost and
proﬁt functions have been frequently applied to estimate eﬃciency of various ﬁnancial intermediaries
in diﬀerent countries. We estimated two diﬀerent concepts of eﬃciency, namely, cost eﬃciency and
proﬁte ﬃciency. For each concept, we speciﬁed two diﬀerent models. The ﬁrst excludes credit risk
and leverage from the model, and the second includes them.
We found that agency costs signiﬁcantly reduce the cost-eﬃciency of CRBs. In fact, they appear
to be much more important than corporate governance issues. These results are consistent with
the observations of Schleifer and Vishny (1997) and other authors referred to therein. After testing
various theories, we obtained only one clear result: increasing managers’ compensation should result
in improved performance of CRBs, which is also in accordance with the expense preference theory.
This theory states that an appropriate compensation package for managers should reduce expense
preference. The policy implication is clear; that is, regulatory agencies shoud avoid imposing controls
on top managers’ compensation. Proponents of such controls usually argue that managers’ compen-
sation should not be too high at the expense of members’ meager revenues. This argument seems
fallacious as such controls would in fact reduce CRB’s sustainability. To clarify our results further, we
ﬁrst ordered our observations on the basis of the ratio of top manager’s salary to personnel expenses
within each size group. The results show that an increase in top manager’s relative compensation
reduces agency costs and improves performance of the CRBs. We also considered eﬃciency measures,
but did not ﬁnd any conclusive results.
Controls on top managers’ compensation have not been actually discussed in Philippines, and we
do not think such a policy should be considered. Based on existing literature, we are of the view that
introduction of adequate performance-based compensation would be more appropriate. However,
we need information to study the beneﬁts of such a scheme to reduce agency costs and improve
performance of mutual ﬁnancial intermediaries such as Philippines’ CRBs.
We also found that rural CRBs are the most proﬁte ﬃcient, despite their somewhat regular cost
eﬃciency, a manifestation that they are able to charge higher fees for the quality of services they
oﬀer. Big CRBs were shown to have the lowest average cost eﬃciency, and worst, they have not
been able to pass these higher costs to customers through higher fees. We then considered quality
of service and diversity of products for each size group, but did not ﬁnd that smaller CRBs have
been oﬀering better quality of services or more diverse products. What we did observe though is
that small CRBs oﬀer lower rates on loans and deposits than larger CRBs. We also demonstrated,
contrary to some common belief, that State intervention in the activities of some CRBs proved to
be fruitful. In order to focus State intervention and avoid the ”growth-diﬀusion of ﬁnancing-failure”
cycle, we propose that special attention should be given to cost structure of larger CRBs, generally
more inclined towards expense preference.
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17Table I 
Definition of variables and their characteristics 
        
         
Dependent Variables - Efficiency   Mean  Std Dev.  Minimum   Median  Maximum 
Costs  Real costs, in millions, deflated by national 1995 Consumer Price Index.  4,79  9,21  0,00  2,46  83,11 
S1  Cost share of deposits and financial obligations, p1x1/C.  34,87%  14,71%  0,00%  35,58%  75,55% 
S2  Cost share of wages, p2x2/C.  55,14%  14,86%  16,92%  54,81%  92,76% 
S3  Cost share of materials, p3x3/C.  9,99%  6,70%  1,55%  7,91%  42,87% 
π  
Real profit, defined as financial income less financial costs, in millions and 
deflated by national 1995 CPI.   2,95 3,63 -19,67 1,93 25,68 
         
Basic Independent Variables    Mean  Std Dev.  Minimum   Median  Maximum 
p1 
Cost of input: Real annual, ex post interest rate on deposits and financial 
obligations, deflated by national 1995 Consumer Price Index.  3,90%  2,76% 0,00% 4,06%  17,90% 
p2 
Cost of input: Real wage rate, in millions of pesos and deflated by 
national 1995 Consumer Price Index.  102,25  89,48 0,00 87,29  477,89 
p3 
Cost of input: Real cost of materials, deflated by national 1995 Consumer 
Price Index.  0,29  0,38 0,00 0,18 2,28 
x1 
Quantity of input: Deposits and financial obligations, in millions, deflated 
by national 1995 Consumer Price Index.  40,86  85,25 0,00 19,44  721,87 
x2  Quantity of input: Number of employees, in thousands.  0,03  0,14  0,00  0,02  2,21 
x3 
Quantity of input: Real value of fixed assets, in millions, deflated by 
national 1995 Consumer Price Index.  2,22  4,58 0,00 0,71  38,44 
y1 
Quantity of output: Loans, in millions, deflated by national 1995 
Consumer Price Index.  35,25  64,39 0,00 19,42  601,56 
y2 
Non-financial operating income, in millions, deflated by national 1995 
Consumer Price Index / Number of members, a measure of quality of 
service to clients.  11,00%  12,27%  0,00%  8,22%  78,90% 
y3 
Diversity of services Index (Add 1 for each service the credit union offers 
among the following: Commercial, Consumer, or Mortgage loans, and 
Deposits), [1, 2, 3, 4, or 5]  3,25  1,43  0,00  4,00  4,00 
         
Variables of Risk   Mean  Std Dev.  Minimum   Median  Maximum 
CRRISK   Credit risk, ex post pass-due loans over net loans ratio.  22,34%  17,80% 0,00% 17,38%  128,48% 
LEVERAGE 
Liabilities over capital ratio. A greater ratio means the institution took 
more financial risk.  6,05 12,02  -7,22  4,07  127,54 Table II 
Estimated coefficients and their significance 
                
Coef.  Variable name  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
α  Constant  -1,32 *** -1,90 ***  3,11  *** 3,44 *** 
β1  Interest rate on deposits and financial obligations.  0,15  ***  0,13  ***  1,23 ***  0,89  *** 
β2  Wage  rate.  0,62 *** 0,68 *** -0,16  ***  -0,21  *** 
β3  Cost of materials.  -0,77    -0,81    -0,07   0,32   
γ1  Quantity of loans.  -0,40  ***  -0,02    0,30 ***  -0,10   
γ2  Non-financial operating income / Number of members.  24,32  ***  23,26  ***  -1,63   -4,60  ** 
γ3  Diversity of services index.  0,03    -0,40  **  -0,54 ***  0,29  *** 
β11 
Interest rate on deposits and financial obligations * Interest rate on 
deposits and financial obligations.  0,00    -0,01    8,33 ***  0,81   
β12  Interest rate on deposits and financial obligations * Wage rate.  -0,04  ***  -0,04  ***  0,65   -0,69   
β13 
Interest rate on deposits and financial obligations * Cost of 
materials. -0,03    -0,05  *  -7,96  **  0,15   
β22  Wage rate * Wage rate.  -0,13  ***  -0,11  ***  0,05 ***  0,05  *** 
β23  Wage rate * Cost of materials.  -0,03  ***  -0,02  ***  -0,03   -0,14   
β33  Cost of materials * Cost of materials.  1,23    1,23    -1,05 ***  -0,20   
γ11  Quantity of loans * Quantity of loans.  0,17  ***  0,13  ***  -0,12 ***  0,01   
γ12 
Quantity of loans * Non-financial operating income / Number of 
members. -5,18  ***  -4,35  **  -7,08  ***  -0,75   
γ13  Quantity of loans * Diversity of services index.  -0,20  ***  -0,19  **  0,57 ***  0,02   
γ22 
Non-financial operating income / Number of members * Non-
financial operating income / Number of members.  -24,81  ***  -25,07  ***  14,42 ***  7,68  *** 
γ23 
Non-financial operating income / Number of members * Diversity of 
services  index.  2,28  1,75   8,11  ***  1,00   
γ33  Diversity of services index * Diversity of services index.  0,02    0,09    -0,72 ***  -0,26 *** 
η11 
Interest rate on deposits and financial obligations * Quantity of 
loans.  0,14 *** 0,15 *** -1,93  ** -0,36  
η12 
Interest rate on deposits and financial obligations * Non-financial 
operating income / Number of members.  0,17  ***  0,06    -0,10 ***  0,02   
η13 
Interest rate on deposits and financial obligations * Diversity of 
services index.  -0,04 *** -0,04 ***  0,91  *** 0,16   
η21  Wage rate * Quantity of loans.  -0,05    -0,04    -9,10   0,67   
η22  Wage rate * Non-financial operating income / Number of members.  0,05    0,00    5,49 ***  4,08  *** 
η23  Wage rate * Diversity of services index.  -0,13  ***  -0,12  ***  3,44   -5,05   
η31  Cost of materials * Quantity of loans.  -0,07  ***  -0,08  ***  2,72   0,59   
η32 
Cost of materials * Non-financial operating income / Number of 
members.  0,13 * 0,28  *** 0,22  ***  0,00  
η33  Cost of materials * Diversity of services index.  -1,20    -0,21    -1,66 ***  -0,11   
υ1  Credit  risk      0,00       -0,01  
υ2  Leverage        0,00  **        0,00  ** 
                
* : 10% level of significance.                 
**:  5% level of significance.                 
***: 1% level of significance.                 Table III 
Most efficient observations by size categories 
              
Size  N  Model 1  N  Model 2  N  Model 3  N  Model 4 
Below  40M  150 66,43% 94 18,93% 111 15,49% 93 17,56% 
40M-60M  32 75,89%  29  21,93% 30 20,08%  27  17,73% 
60M-80M  17 75,87%  15  24,73% 17 21,74%  15  22,07% 
Above  80M  51 36,64%  42  21,60% 51 20,00%  42  22,07% 
              
Average efficiency by size categories 
              
Size  N  Model 1  N  Model 2  N  Model 3  N  Model 4 
Below  40M  150 81,87% 94 32,86% 111 20,08% 93 20,92% 
40M-60M  32 82,74%  29  33,41% 30 34,83%  27  22,47% 
60M-80M  17 84,26%  15  33,27% 17 36,19%  15  31,02% 
Above  80M  51 80,76%  42  32,85% 51 30,97%  42  32,17% 
              
Average relative efficiency by size categories 
              
Size  N  Model 1  N  Model 2  N  Model 3  N  Model 4 
Below  40M  150 81,13% 94 57,62% 111 77,11% 93 83,95% 
40M-60M  32 91,72%  29  65,65% 30 57,67%  27  78,91% 
60M-80M  17 90,04%  15  74,33% 17 60,07%  15  71,17% 
Above  80M  51 45,37%  42  65,73% 51 64,57%  42  68,62% 
              
Note:  Most efficient observations are defined as the minimum cost or the maximum profit 
for each size group. Average efficiency is the simple average of efficiency for each size 
group. Average relative efficiency is measured comparatively to most efficient observation, 
as in Equations 8 and 10. We concentrate our analysis on the last section of the table. 
According to model I, CRBs whose assets are between 40 and 60 millions pesos are the 
most cost efficient on average. In effect, 92% of costs are efficiently used, leaving only 8% 
of cost-inefficiency. The 60-80M category had 10% of inefficiency on average, while CRBs 
whose assets are below 40 millions pesos had 19% of inefficiency. Notwithstanding, these 
figures are still much lower than the 55% of inefficiency of the 51 largest CRBs. The 
introduction of credit risk and leverage variables changed considerably the cost-efficiency 
figures. The first three groups are less cost-efficient when considering these aspects, while 
the last group is now more efficient. A conclusion similar to the discussion of Berger and 
Mester. Nonetheless, it seems that most cost-efficient CRBs have assets within the 40-80 
millions pesos range. Profit-efficiency presented a rather different pattern: Least efficient 
institutions were within the 40-80 millions range with Model III (without risk variables). The 




Definition of correlates and their characteristics 
         
Correlates of Size   Mean  Std Dev.  Minimum   Median  Maximum 
SMALL 
Dummy variable: 1 if the assets of the rural bank are below 40 millions of 
pesos, 0 elsewhere.   0,60  0,49  0,00  1,00  1,00 
MEDIUM 
Dummy variable: 1 if the assets of the rural bank are between 40 and 60 
millions of pesos, 0 elsewhere.   0,13  0,33 0,00 0,00 1,00 
LARGE 
Dummy variable: 1 if the assets of the rural bank are between 60 and 80 
millions of pesos, 0 elsewhere.   0,07  0,25  0,00  0,00  1,00 
HUGE 
Dummy variable: 1 if the assets of the rural bank are above 80 millions of 
pesos, 0 elsewhere.   0,20  0,40 0,00 0,00 1,00 
         
Correlates of Market Characteristics   Mean  Std Dev.  Minimum   Median  Maximum 
RURAL 
Dummy variable: 1 if the rural bank is located in a rural region, 0 
elsewhere.   75,43%  43,14%  0,00%  100,00%  100,00% 
HERFBKS  Herfindahl index of deposits market within national banking sector.  7,48%  0,75%  6,69%  7,34%  8,54% 
FIRST4BKS  Proportion of first four banks in the overall deposits of the banking sector.   17,98%  8,80%  0,96%  21,40%  25,57% 
HERFCRB 
Herfindahl index of deposits market within national sector of cooperative 
rural banks.  30,21%  8,93%  17,23% 34,04% 39,00% 
FIRST4CRB 
Proportion of first four banks in the overall deposits of the cooperative 
rural banks' sector.   50,60%  6,32%  41,68% 54,16% 57,11% 
PIBKS 
Average financial margin of the national banking system, in millions of 
pesos.  8,06%  2,25% 4,28% 8,49%  10,64% 
PERSBKS  Average personnel expenses over assets of the national banking system.  1,15%  0,07%  1,02%  1,16%  1,23% 
DEPCREDBKS  Average ratio of deposits over credits of the national banking system.  1,17  0,35  0,93  1,02  1,86 
CRRISKBKS  Credit risk, ex post pass-due loans ratio of national commercial banks.   7,33%  3,64% 2,84% 5,97%  12,55% 
        
Correlates of Corporate Governance   Mean  Std Dev.  Minimum   Median  Maximum 
SHRDUM 
Dummy variable: 1 if the proportion of capital over liabilities is greater 
than the median of rural banks, 0 elsewhere. Measure the degree of 
diffusion of control, which reduces potential capacity of stakeholders to 
influence  managers.    0,42  0,50 0,00 0,00 1,00 
DEPLIAB 
Proportion of deposits over liabilities, a greater ratio means less free cash 
flows, and thus a better corporate governance control.   0,51  0,18  0,10  0,53  0,98 
AVGSHR 
Diffusion of ownership: Average value of shareholdings, in millions. A 
greater value is associated to a potentially greater influence of 
shareholders over managers.   0,42  0,37  0,00  0,30  2,31  
 
Table IV (Cont.) 
Definition of variables and their characteristics 
          
Correlates of Corporate Governance   Mean  Std Dev.  Minimum   Median  Maximum 
COOPMEMB 
Proportion of institutional members (cooperatives) over individual 
members.  0,04  0,27 0,01 0,02  3,80 
GVTINT 
Dummy variable: 1 if the government intervened the rural bank in the 
current year, 0 elsewhere.   0,09  0,28  0,00  0,00  1,00 
MGTWAGE 
Top manager salary as a proportion of total assets (in thousands) of the 
rural bank.   0,48  0,71 0,00 0,33  7,13 
          
Correlates of Risk   Mean  Std Dev.  Minimum   Median  Maximum 
CRRISK   Credit risk, defined as ex post pass-due loans ratio.  22,34%  17,80% 0,00% 17,38%  128,48% 
LEVERAGE 
Liabilities over capital ratio. A greater ratio means the institution took 
more financial risk.  6,05  12,02  -7,22  4,07  127,54 
ROA  Return on assets.  2,55%  3,28%  -10,69%  2,40%  12,43% 
ROE  Return on equity.  8,87%  67,37%  -720,22%  11,98%  532,00% 
INTGAP 
Interest rate risk: The interest rate Gap, measured as the ratio of short 
term assets over short term liabilities, gives an approximation of interest 
rate risk exposure.  2,73  1,68 0,87 2,18  11,16 
          
Correlates of agency costs   Mean  Std Dev.  Minimum   Median  Maximum 
OFICMEMB 
Number of offices by members (in thousands), a greater proportion 
reveals expense preference.  0,02  0,02 0,00 0,01  0,13 
ASSETMEMB  Average quantity of assets (in millions of pesos) by member.  0,78  1,57  0,00  0,37  14,14 
DEPCRED 
Proportion of deposits collocated into credits, a lower proportion means 
resources from deposits were invested in other activities than financial 
intermediation. 78,31%  271,34%  9,34%  55,22%  3812,19% 
FIXASSETS 
Proportion of fixed assets over total assets. A greater proportion means 
assets were diverted into unproductive uses of funds.  4,39%  4,42%  0,59%  3,32%  40,43% 
SUFMARG 
Sufficiency of financial margin: (Financial income - Financial costs) / 
Operational costs. Measures the proportion of operational costs covered 
by the financial margin. A greater measure is associated to efficient 
management.  78,64% 49,55% -100,92% 76,19% 363,98% 
 Table V 
Estimated coefficients of the correlates and their significance 
                    


















Correlates of Size 
SMALL  0,36 ***  0,13 ***  -0,09   -0,10 ***  0,02   0,15 ***  0,10   0,12 *** 
MEDIUM  0,51 ***  0,18 ***  0,05   0,04   -0,07   -0,14 ***  0,09   0,01  
LARGE  0,46 ***  0,15 ***  0,07   0,13 ***  -0,05   -0,11 **  0,00   -0,08 ** 
HUGE  0,00 ***  -0,38 ***  0,00 ***  0,05 *  0,00 ***  -0,07 **  0,00 ***  -0,13 *** 
                          
Correlates of Market Characteristics 
RURAL  -0,03   -0,05 *  0,07   0,00   0,04   0,07 **  -0,08   0,07 *** 
HERFBKS  -1,26   0,01   -0,81   -1,51   0,93   1,77   -0,99   2,41 * 
FIRST4BKS  0,18   0,02   0,06    -0,23   0,22    0,11   0,24    0,23   
HERFCRB  -0,65   0,41 ***  -0,31   0,03   -0,12   0,15   -1,07   0,16  
FIRST4CRB  0,75   0,56 ***  0,38   0,06   0,56   0,22   1,42   0,22 ** 
PIBKS  0,00 ***  -0,95 *  0,00 ***  0,40   0,00 ***  -0,81   0,00 ***  -1,03 * 
PERSBKS  0,00 ***  8,01   0,00 ***  -30,07 *  0,00 ***  15,36   0,00 ***  27,51 ** 
DEPCREDBKS  -0,04   0,04   0,02   -0,03   -0,10   0,05   -0,07   0,06  
CRRISKBKS  0,00 ***  -0,93 ***  0,00 ***  -0,18    0,00 ***  -0,24    0,00 ***  -0,24 * 
                          
Correlates of Corporate Governance 
SHRDUM  -0,01   0,11 ***  0,02   -0,05 **  0,05   0,10 ***  0,04   0,11  
DEPLIAB  0,19   -0,06   0,42   -0,14 *  -0,23   -0,18 ***  -0,02   -0,04  
AVGSHR  0,03    0,08 **  0,05    -0,02    -0,10    -0,02    -0,02    -0,02   
  
Table V (Cont.) 
Estimated coefficients of the correlates and their significance 
                           


















Correlates of Corporate Governance 
COOPMEMB  -0,03   0,02   -0,04   -0,03   -0,04   -0,07   -0,03   -0,04  
GVTINT  -0,01   0,03   -0,05   -0,05   -0,02   0,02   0,05   0,07 ** 
MGTWAGE  -0,03    0,03 *  -0,10    -0,04    0,04    0,05 ***  0,01    0,13 *** 
                              
Correlates of Risk 
CRRISK   0,17   0,38 ***  0,33 **  0,09   0,17   0,13 *  0,02   0,15 *** 
LEVERAGE  0,00   0,00   0,00   0,00   -0,01   0,00 **  0,00   0,00  
ROA  -1,05   -0,86 **  -0,73   -0,25   -1,77   0,67 *  -1,31   0,78 ** 
ROE  0,05   -0,02   -0,03   0,01   0,14   0,02   0,02   0,02  
INTGAP  0,05    0,01    0,04    0,00    -0,03    0,02 ***  0,00    0,02 ** 
                              
Correlates of agency costs 
OFICMEMB  -0,50   -3,31 ***  -2,03   1,36 **  -1,29   -0,63   -0,27   -2,21 *** 
ASSETMEMB  0,01   -0,05 ***  0,08 *  0,04 ***  0,02   -0,01   -0,03   -0,05 *** 
DEPCRED  -0,02   0,00   -0,08   -0,06   -0,14   0,00   -0,19   -0,12 *** 
FIXASSETS  -0,12   -0,48   -0,29   -0,28   0,18   -0,35   -0,40   -0,68 ** 
SUFMARG  -0,03    0,00    -0,02    0,00    0,11    0,08 ***  0,09    0,12 *** 
                              
* : 10% level of significance.                             
**:  5% level of significance.                             
***: 1% level of significance.                             
  
Table VI 
Impact of top manager's compensation on performance of the CRB 
                          
        Corporate Governance  Agency costs  Risk and performance 





expenses  SHRDUM DEPLIAB AVGSHR ASSETMEMB DEPCRED FIXASSETS SUFMARG CRRISK ROA  ROE 
 Group  1  29  0,50%  62,07%  52,67%  47,96%  29,48%  55,99%  3,37%  71,89%  32,98%  1,72%  7,56% 
 Group  2  28  0,77%  71,43%  49,53%  56,22%  33,16%  51,99%  3,61%  70,86%  24,55%  1,63%  1,72% 
< 40 M  Group 3  28  1,20%  82,14%  47,98%  34,93%  30,25%  49,96%  4,72%  86,52%  27,50%  2,01%  26,41% 
  Group  4  28  4,19%  85,71%  60,52%  44,42% 12,63% 238,57% 5,83% 103,37%  20,86%  3,72%  10,25% 
   Total  113  1,66%  75,22%  52,61%  45,91%  28,16%  97,50%  4,37%  82,79%  26,65%  2,24%  11,51% 
                        
   Group 1  12  0,31%  25,00%  50,57%  34,65%  47,13%  52,05%  4,39%  90,11%  16,39%  3,75%  17,48% 
 Group  2  11  0,54%  18,18%  51,79%  36,81%  48,80%  64,79%  4,16%  73,96%  24,97%  1,93%  -58,39% 
40-80 M  Group 3  11  0,67%  45,45%  40,37%  56,66%  88,16%  42,66%  4,01%  73,31%  22,20%  1,92%  1,53% 
 Group  4  11  0,94%  63,64%  51,90%  47,09%  30,98%  55,06%  3,30%  64,28%  21,60%  2,88%  10,91% 
   Total  45  0,61%  37,78%  48,70%  43,60%  48,69%  53,53%  3,97%  76,05%  21,39%  2,66%  -5,77% 
                        
   Group 1  13  0,09%  0,00%  54,97%  43,94%  273,33%  60,44%  4,69%  51,02%  15,58%  1,98%  3,55% 
 Group  2  12  0,18%  8,33%  50,93%  29,63%  211,75%  58,91%  6,54%  58,83%  15,56%  2,67%  13,21% 
> 80 M  Group 3  12  0,31%  0,00%  50,19%  27,79%  177,09%  54,75%  3,05%  68,58%  12,78%  2,86%  19,75% 
 Group  4  12  0,79%  8,33%  41,34%  26,28%  157,54%  50,02%  4,39%  102,98%  13,45%  4,10%  22,36% 
   Total  49  0,34%  4,08%  49,47%  32,15%  205,90%  56,07%  4,67%  69,96%  14,32%  2,88%  14,49% 
                          
Note:  To complete this Table, we first ordered the observation on the basis of the top manager's salary over personnel expenses ratio within each size group. 
Note that we merged groups 2 and 3 into a 40-80 millions category for space considerations. We can observe that an increase of top manager's relative 
compensation reduces agency costs and improves performance of the CRB. It also is associated with a tighter corporate control scheme.  We also considered 
efficiency measures, but did not find conclusive results. 